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INTRODUCTION
Defendant and Appellant Claudia N. Case, individually and as Trustee of the
Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 1993 and the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated
January 21, 1999, appeals from a series of orders entered by the Fourth Judicial District
Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, as follows:
a.

The trial court's order of November 1, 2000 (R. 0289, attachment 1 hereto);

b.

The trial court's judgment of February 16, 2001 (R. 0237, attachment 2
hereto);

c.

The trial court's order clarifying judgment dated July 2, 2001 (R. 0377,
attachment 3 hereto); and

d.

The trial court's order of dismissal of the Third Claim for Relief entered
March 21, 2005 (R. 0740, attachment 4 hereto).

Through the above-referenced rulings, the trial court held - as a matter of law, and
without even giving Appellant an opportunity for oral argument, much less trial on the
merits - that Plaintiffs Arnold K. West and Mary Helen West were entitled to an order,
judgment and decree quieting title in and to a parcel of real property located in Utah
County, State of Utah, in themselves, free and clear of any claim of right, title or interest
therein by Appellant or the Trusts on whose behalf she acted, notwithstanding Appellees'
open admission that they had failed to comply in full with the terms and conditions of the
real estate contract entered into with the original trustor; further, finding Appellant in
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breach of the real estate contract, ordering specific enforcement of the contract in the
form of a warranty deed from Appellant to Appellees, and awarding Appellees their costs
and attorneys' fees. Appellees' supplemental claim for slander of title was reserved for
trial, but abandoned by Appellees on the eve of trial.
Ample evidence appears in the trial court record which should have precluded the
entry of summary judgment herein. By Appellees' own admission, and as the trial court
expressly found, they failed to perform an express covenant in the 1987 real estate
contract under which they claimed title to the Subject Property: They did not pay any
taxes on the property during the contract period. Their explanation for this failure is that
Georgia Lamar West, the named seller under the contract, had told them that they need
not pay the taxes. In separate conversations with her daughter (Appellant), however,
Georgia Lamar West expressed concern that the taxes were not being paid. They likewise
took the insistent step of conveying her interest in the property to the 1993 Trust. Finally,
when Appellees came to her for a corrective warranty deed in 1998, claiming to have paid
off the 1987 contract, Georgia Lamar West refused the conveyance - conduct clearly and
consistent with having waived Appellees' obligation to pay taxes under the 1987 contract.
These acts, coupled with expressions of concern to her daughter, all as set out in the
lower court record, showed a precluded summary judgment.
Even if the Court were correct in finding breach, the breach should have been
ascribed to the estate of Georgia Lamar West, and not to Appellant or the Trusts which
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she represents. Neither Appellant nor the Trusts are property "successors" of the estate
under governing case law, and should not be found in breach of the contract.
Finally, Appellant was entitled to oral argument on the various motions
culminating in the final order of summary judgment herein.
JURISDICTION AND BASIS FOR APPEAL
This is an appeal from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah
County, State of Utah, quieting title in and to a parcel of real property located in Utah
County, State of Utah; finding, as a matter of law, that Defendant was in breach of her
Uniform Real Estate Contract relating to that property; ordering specific performance of
the Real Estate Contract, and awarding costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to the terms of
the contract. Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). The
appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(5).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs/

Appellees were entitled to an order quieting title in and to the Subject Property in them,
free and clear of any claim of Defendant/Appellant1.

]

This issue was not addressed to the trial court on motion for summary judgment;
however, to the extent that it challenges the justiciability of the claim, it goes to the
subject matter jurisdiction of the court, and may therefore be raised at any point in the
proceedings - see State v. Sun Surety Insurance Co., 2004 UT 74, 99 P. 3d 818.
700216vl
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2.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Defendant/

Appellant was in breach of the 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract through her refusal to
convey, on behalf of the May 6, 1993 trust for the January 21, 1999 trust any interest in
and to the Subject Property, notwithstanding Appellees' failure to pay taxes on the
Subject Property during the contract period as required by the terms of the 1987 Uniform
Real Estate Contract, thus entitling Plaintiff/Appellees to specific performance of the
contract and an award of costs and attorneys fees2.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Georgia

Lamar West had waived Appellees' obligation to taxes on the Subject Property during the
period of the 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract3.
4.

Whether the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that Defendant/

Appellant was the successor-in-interest to the Georgia Lamar West and/or the Estate of
Georgia Lamar West, and therefore obligated under the 1987 Uniform Real Estate
Contract4.
5.

Whether the lower court erred in denying Appellant oral argument on

summary judgment5.

Preserved at R. 0199, 0300, 0336.
Preserved at R. 0199, 0300, 0336.
"Preserved at R. 0199, 0300, 0336.
Preserved at R.0190, 0241, 0299, 0326.
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The standard of review for all of the foregoing issues is that applicable to orders
granting summary judgment generally - the decision is reviewed for correctness,
affording no deference to the trial court's decision. Schurtz v. BMW of North America,
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991); Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of
Springville, 1999 Utah 25, 979 P.2d 332. The court reviews the record, and construes all
facts in the light most favorable to defendant/appellant, and sustains the lower court's
ruling only if, as a matter of law, no genuine issue of material fact existed precluding
entry of summary judgment. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991);
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah
1991).
CITATION OF DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Peterson v. Peterson, 190 P.2d 135, 112 Utah 554 (Utah 1948)
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 (UT App. 1988)
Andrus v. Bagley, 115 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989)
Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940)
UPC, Inc. v. ROA General, Inc., 990 P.2d 945 (UT App. 1999)
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975)
Rule 4-501(3)(C), Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.6

6

Since the effective courts' rulings in this regard, Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration has been repealed and replaced by various provisions of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
700216vl
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Appellees Arnold K. West and Mary Helen West ("Appellees") filed this
action on December 28, 1999, claiming that (1) they were entitled to a finding that
Defendant and Appellant Claudia N. Case, individually and as Trustee of the Lamar West
Trust dated May 6, 1993 and the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated January 21, 1999, was
in breach of a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated April 8, 1987 between Georgia Lamar
West and Appellees, under which Georgia Lamar West promised (pursuant to the terms
and conditions of the 1987 agreement) to convey to Appellees title to a parcel of real
property located in Utah County, State of Utah; (2) an order quieting title in and to the
Subject Property in Appellees; and (3) a judgment in favor of Appellees and against
Appellants for Appellants' slander of Appellees' title to the Subject Property.
Appellees filed a motion for partial summary judgment on July 25, 2000, seeking
judgment as a matter of law on their breach of contract and quiet title claims, and
reserving the slander of title claim for trial. The trial court initially denied the motion for
summary judgment, finding factual disputes as to Appellees' performance of the 1987
agreement (R. 0237); thereafter, however, the court reversed itself and granted the motion
(R. 0247, 0389). In entering judgment, the court quieted title to the Subject Property in
Appellees; found Appellant - not the estate of Georgia Lamar West - in breach of the
1987 agreement; ordered specific performance of the 1987 agreement by Appellant; and
awarded Appellees their costs and attorneys' fees.
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Subsequent motion practice clarified that the award of attorneys' fees was against
the Trusts represented by Appellant Claudia N. Case, and not against Claudia N. Case
individually; in other respects, the court did not modify its prior ruling (R. 0377).
Appellees' remaining claim for slander of title was reserved for trial, which was
scheduled to commence March 21, 2005. On that date, however, the parties presented the
court with a stipulation dismissing the slander of title claim, resulting in a final order of
the court as of that date (R. 0740).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Underlying Facts
1.

Plaintiffs/Appellees Arnold K. West and Mary Helen West are individuals

who reside at 3660 West 100 North, American Fork, Utah County, State of Utah.
(Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, 0024.)
2.

Defendant/Appellant is an individual who, at the times relevant to this

action, has also been a resident of Utah County, State of Utah. (Complaint, R. 0015;
Answer, 0024.)
3.

Defendant and Plaintiff Mary Helen West are sisters, and daughters of

Georgia Lamar West (formerly known as Lamar Nerdin). The children of Georgia Lamar
West are as follows:
Lewis L. Dade;
Georgia LaRay Christensen;
Marion William Dade;
Mark Ernest Dade;
700216vl
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Mary Helen West;
Joseph William Nerdin;
Betty Jo Nerdin West; and
Defendant Claudia Nerdin Case.
(May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152)
4.

On or about April 8, 1987, Appellees entered into a Uniform Real Estate

Contract with Georgia Lamar West ("1987 Agreemenf), pursuant to the terms of which
Appellees agreed to purchase, and Georgia Lamar West agreed to sell, a parcel of land
located in Utah County, State of Utah, at 386 West Pacific Drive, American Fork, Utah,
more particularly described as follows:
Parcel 2: Beginning 378.50 feet West along the monument line and 333.45
feet South from the American Fork City monument at the center line
intersection of 300 West Street and 300 North Street; thence North 84°30'
West 30.00 feet; thence South 16 0 59 , 15 ,/ West 176.14 feet to the North
Right-of-Way line of Union Pacific Railroad Company; thence South
63°23' East 89.29 feet along said Right-of-Way line; thence North 0°25'
East 205.68 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 0.25 acres.
Parcel 3: Beginning 378.50 feet West along the monument line and South 333.45
feet from the American Fork City monument at the center line intersection of 300
West Street and 300 North Street; thence South 0°25'00" West 205.58 feet to the
North Right-of-Way line of the Union Pacific Railroad Company; thence South
63°23'00" East 55.40 feet along said Right-of-Way line; thence North 0°25'00"
East 225.61 feet along the fence line; thence North 84°30'00" West 49.91 feet to
the point of beginning. Containing 0.246 acres.
("Subject Property"). (Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, 0024; 1987 Agreement, R. 0157)
5.

The 1987 Agreement provided in part as follows:

The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature
which are or which may be assessed and which may become due on these
premises during the life of this Agreement. The Seller hereby covenants
700216vl
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and agrees that there are no assessments against said premises except the
following:
a.

Buyer and the Seller mutually agree that the Seller is to retain
exclusive ownership of the usage of an existing flowing well
located on Parcel 2 as named above and that the Buyer is not
purchasing by this Agreement any rights appurtenant to the
usage of the well or any water flowing from said well.

(May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152)
6.

The Agreement further provided in part as follows:

In the event of the failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or
upon failure of the Buyer to make any payment or payments when the same
shall become due, or within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Seller, at his
option shall have the following alternative remedies:

700216vl

a.

Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to
remedy the default within five (5) days after written notice, to
be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey
said property, at all payment which have been made
theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to
the Seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance of
the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his
option re-enter and take possession of said premises without
legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with
all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon,
and the said additions and improvements shall remain with the
land, shall become property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming
at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or

b.

The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all
delinquent installments, including costs and attorney's fees.
(The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not
prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to one of the
other remedies hereafter in the event of a subsequent default);
or
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c.

The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written
notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid balance
hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this
contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to the Buyer
subject thereto, and to proceed immediately to foreclose the
same in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and
have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the
payment of the balance owing, including costs and attorney's
fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency
which may remain.

(May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152)
7.

The parties to the 1987 Agreement agreed that time was of the essence to

the performance thereof. (May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152)
8.

On the same date as the 1987 Agreement, Lamar West executed a Warranty

Deed, with herself as Grantor and Appellees as Grantees, conveying the subject property
to Plaintiffs, and placed the same in escrow pending full payment under the contract.
(Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, R. 0024; 1987 Warranty Deed, R. 0154)
9.

Between 1987 and 1998, Appellees made payments under the contract;

Appellees never, however, paid taxes assessed against the subject property by Utah
County. (Affidavit of Claudia Case, R.0188, at 1| 8)
10.

Before the trial court, Appellees maintained that, during her lifetime,

Georgia Lamar West told them that "they did not have to worry about paying the property
taxes on the property and that she would pay the property taxes for the time period that
the warranty deed was to be held in escrow" (see Supplemental Affidavit of Mary Helen
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West, R. 210, at ^f 4); Appellees never maintained, however, that their obligation to pay
taxes under the 1987 contract was waived in writing.
11.

On or about May 6, 1993, Georgia Lamar West created the Lamar West

Trust. (May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152)
12.

The express purpose of the Lamar West Trust was for the primary benefit of

Lamar West during her lifetime, and her family thereafter. (May 6, 1993 Trust
Agreement, R. 0152)
13.

The 1993 Trust designated Georgia Lamar West as original Trustee thereof,

and Appellees as replacement Trustees in the event of (and for the period of) any
incapacitation of Georgia Lamar West. (May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152)
14.

Also on May 6, 1993, Georgia Lamar West executed a quitclaim deed

which purported to convey all of her right, title and interest in and to, inter alia, the
subject property to the 1993 Trust. (Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, R. 0027; R. 0133)
15.

Between the date of the 1987 Agreement and November 20, 1997,

Appellant performed numerous care services for Georgia Lamar West, including purchase
of groceries and supplies, transportation, healthcare, and other similar services; however,
Georgia Lamar West began to express concerns to Appellant, and other family members,
over the manner in which Appellees took the checkbook away from her and took her mail
away from her. According to Georgia Lamar West, checks drawn on her account were
not always signed by her. She expressed concern on several occasions that she was
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concerned that Appellees were going to place her in a nursing home, and was under great
fear that she would in fact be placed in a nursing home. (See Defendants' Answers to
Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories, and Request for
Production of Documents, R. 0666, at Answer to Interrogatory No. 9, p. 6 thereof.)
16.

During the same conversations, Georgia Lamar West expressed concern to

Appellant that taxes on the property were not being paid. Id,
17.

On November 20, 1997, Georgia Lamar West executed an amendment to

the 1993 Trust, which, among other changes, removed Appellees as named successor
trustees, and appointed Defendant and her sister, Betty Jo Nerdin West, as successor
co-trustees thereunder. (R. 0123)
18.

On March 30, 1998, Appellees sought and received, from the escrow

handling the 1987 contract, notification that all payments due under the 1987 contract had
been paid, and presenting the 1987 Warranty Deed for recording. (Complaint, R. 0015;
Answer, R. 0024)
19.

Upon recording of the 1987 Warranty Deed, however, Appellees received a

Notice of Discrepancy from the Office of the Utah County Recorder, noting that, as of
that date, the Grantor was not vested with title, rather, that title had been conveyed to the
1993 Trust with Lamar West as Trustee. (Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, R. 0024)
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20.

Appellees thereupon prepared a replacement Warranty Deed, and made

demand upon Georgia Lamar West to execute the same on behalf of the 1993 Trust.
(Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, R. 0024)
21.

Georgia Lamar West, on behalf of herself and the 1993 Trust, refused to

execute Appellees' proposed Warranty Deed in 1998. (Complaint, R. 0015; Answer,
R. 0024)
22.

On January 21, 1999, Georgia Lamar West established the Georgia Lamar

West Trust of that date ("1999 Trust"). (R. 0126)
23.

By its terms, the 1999 Trust "amends in its entirety any other Trust I may

have." (R. 0126)
24.

The 1999 Trust had, as its stated and express purpose, the provision for

Marion William Dade during his lifetime, and after his death, the distribution of trust
assets among the children of Georgia Lamar West as provided therein. (R. 0126)
25.

Pursuant to the terms of the 1999 Trust, Georgia Lamar West, as Trustor,

expressed her intent to transfer all property in the 1993 Trust to the 1999 Trust. (R. 0126)
26.

Claudia N. Case was named as Trustee of the 1999 Trust. (R. 0126)

27.

Georgia Lamar West died March 1, 1999. (R. 0015)

28.

Appellant thereafter executed a quit-claim deed dated June 9, 1999.

(R. 0098)
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29.

By the quit-claim deed, Appellant transferred, from the 1993 Trust to the

1999 Trust, all of the 1993 Trust rights, title and interest in and to the following described
parcel of real property:
Beginning at a fence corner, which point is South 165.14 feet and west
361.08 feet from the Southwest corner of Block 36, Plat "A", American
Fork City survey of building lots; Thence North 89°33 , 33" West along a
fence line, 217.23 feet to a fence comer; Thence South 0°31 '39" West
along a fence line, 153.42 feet to a fence corner; thence South 81°51 '18"
West along a fence, 9.53 feet to a fence line; thence South 5°33'26"West
along a fence line, 162.79 feet to the North line of the Union Pacific
Railroad Right-of-Way; Thence South 63°33'33" East along said Right-ofWay, 270.54 feet to a fence line: Thence North 0°12'36" East along said
fence line, 435.59 feet to the point of beginning area-1.979 acres.
("Quit-Claim Deed Property"). (R. 0098)
30.

Appellant was given to understand that there were two purposes for the

1999 Quit-Claim Deed:
a.

Utah County had advised that there were discrepancies in the legal
descriptions, and the deed was intended to correct such
discrepancies; and

b.

The Deed was part of a general transfer of assets (including money
and CDs) from one Trust to the other.

(Affidavit of Claudia Case, R. 0364 at If 3.)
B.

Course of Proceedings Before the Trial Court
31.

Plaintiffs/Appellees filed a Complaint herein on December 28, 1999.

(R.0015)
700216vl
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32.

In the Complaint, Appellees sought an order quieting title in and to the

Subject Property in themselves, free and clear of any claim by Appellant or the Trusts
which she represents; further, a judgment for breach of contract by Appellant; finally, for
damages due to an alleged slander of the title to the property. (R. 0015)
33.

Appellees moved the court for partial summary judgment on July 25, 2000,

and requested oral argument as of that same date. (R. 0065)
34.

Appellees' reply memorandum in support of their motion for partial

summary judgment filed September 5, 2000, attached additional and supplemental
affidavits, raising new allegations of fact which Appellees did not have the opportunity to
address. (R. 0234)
35.

The trial court's initial memorandum decision, entered September 6, 2000

(R.0237), denied Appellees' motion for summary judgment; thereafter, by memorandum
decision dated October 2, 2000 (R. 0247), the court reversed itself and granted summary
judgment quieting title in and to the Subject Property in Appellees, finding Appellant to
be successor-in-interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and liable to Appellees
for breach of that agreement; and ordering specific performance of the agreement in the
form of a warranty deed from Appellant to Appellees. No hearing was afforded in this
regard. The court's October 2, 2000 memorandum decision was reflected in an order
dated November 1, 2000. (R. 0389)
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36.

On November 13, 2000, Appellant moved for an amendment of the Court's

order and for reconsideration, requesting oral argument thereon. (R. 0302)
37.

By memorandum decision dated January 18, 2001, the trial court denied

Appellant's motion, and again refused to grant oral argument. (R. 0340)
38.

The court's memorandum decision was reflected in an order dated

February 15, 2001. (R. 0345)
39.

The trial court entered judgment on February 16, 2001 in favor of Appellees

and against Appellant in the amount of $1,537.50 for attorneys' fees. (R. 0347)
40.

By order dated July 2, 2001, the trial court clarified its prior rulings in the

case, holding that all judgments entered therein were against the Defendant trust and not
against Claudia N. Case individually. (R. 0377)
41.

Pursuant to Stipulation dated March 21, 2005, Appellees' remaining cause

of action (slander of title) was dismissed by court order of that same date. The court's
order was entered as a final adjudication of all issues in the case on the merits effective as
of that date. (R. 0740)
RELATED OR PRIOR APPEALS
There are no related or prior appeals relative to this action.7

7

In a separate and unrelated proceeding, styled Gordon Case & Company, a Utah
business entity, Plaintiff, v. Arnold West, an individual, and Mary Helen West, an
individual, Defendants (Case No. 030200433), Gordon Case, husband to Appellant,
sought eviction of Appellees from the Subject Property following a non-judicial
foreclosure of a deed of trust on the Subject Property. The trial court dismissed the
700216vl
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellees' Complaint did not make out a cause of action under the Utah Quiet
Title Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1, et seq. Appellees did not allege, and have not
shown facts to establish, that they were defending their title in and to the Subject Property
against an adverse claim; rather, they were claiming a contract right to receive a
conveyance of title under a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Under governing law, the
order quieting title was therefore inappropriate.
In compelling specific performance of the 1987 agreement, the trial court
overlooked evidence of record establishing the existence of genuine issues of material
fact. Specifically, the trial court disregarded the fact that, in petitioning for specific
performance of the 1987 agreement, Appellees had failed to perform a material covenant
under that agreement - they failed to pay the taxes on the property during the contract
period, a payment expressly incumbent upon them under the terms of the agreement. The
trial court's observation that Georgia Lamar West, the trustor of both Appellant Trusts,
had "waived" the tax payment requirement was clearly not sustainable as a matter of
law - both by words to Appellant Claudia N. Case and by her conduct in transferring title
to the 1993 Trust, and in refusing to convey title to Appellees when they claimed to have

action, from which Plaintiff Gordon Case appealed to this Court (Appeal No. 20040135CA).
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performed the 1987 agreement in full, Georgia Lamar West evidenced an intent not to
waive the requirements of the agreement.
Even if the Court were to find that Georgia Lamar West was in breach of the 1987
agreement (when, in 1998, she refused to convey title to the property), that breach should
not be ascribable to the Appellant or the Trusts she represents. Neither Appellant nor the
Trusts are "successors-in-interest" within the meaning of governing case law. The party
in breach (if any) should be the estate of Georgia Lamar West.
Appellees' proffered evidence concerning "waiver," in fact, consisted of their
testimonies that, prior to her death, Georgia Lamar West actually volunteered to make tax
payments herself, rather than asking Appellees to honor their contractual commitment to
do so. As such, the suggested "waiver" is actually a modification of the terms of the 1987
agreement; since the agreement itself is required to be in writing under Utah's Statute of
Frauds, any claimed verbal modification thereof is invalid, and should not have formed
the basis of summary judgment.
Finally, Appellant was entitled (pursuant to both procedural rules in effect at the
time, and those which have replaced them) to oral argument on Appellees' motion for
partial summary judgment, and on motions brought subsequent to the court's ruling
thereon. Yet the court ruled in each instance without affording the parties a chance to
present argument.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

APPELLEES' CLAIMS WERE NOT PROPERLY
BEFORE THE COURT IN AN ACTION FOR QUIET
TITLE, AND DEFICIENT UNDER RULE 12(b)(6),
Utah R. CIV. P.

Appellees' Second Claim for Relief was pled, and urged on motion for partial
summary judgment, as one to quiet title in and to the Subject Property and Appellees, free
and clear of Appellant's claim. Appellees' supporting allegations, however, did not make
out a quiet title claim; rather, they sought specific enforcement of a contract to acquire
title to the Subject Property. As such, Appellees' Complaint did not state a quiet title
claim, and was deficient under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P.; for the same reason, the
trial court erred in granting the requested relief.
An action to quiet title is a statutory proceeding - its bases are established, and its
remedies limited, by legislation. JackB. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131
(Utah 1988). Utah's quiet title statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1, et seq.9 establishes the
bases and parameters of a quiet title action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1 defines a quiet
title action:
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an
estate or interest in real property or an interest or claim to personal property
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.
In the case of State, et al v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335 (Utah 1979), the court held that the
quiet title statute could not be relied upon by a holder of a lien on real property:
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[A] quiet title action, as its name connotes, is one to quiet an existing title
against an adverse or hostile claim of another and not one brought to
establish title. One seeking such equitable relief must establish title,
entitlement to possession, and that the estate or interest claimed by others is
adverse or hostile to the alleged claims of title or interest. Hence it is to be
seen that the effect of a decree quieting title is not to vest title but rather is
to perfect an existing title as against other claimants.
590 P.2d at 337 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield,
cited supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that an action in quiet title could not sustain
claim by a vendor under a Uniform Real Estate Contract against the assignee of the
vendee's interest thereunder, for damages due to refusal to release title to property.
Appellees' Complaint in this matter (R. 0015) nowhere asserts that they hold title
to the Subject Property. Rather, they assert contract rights to receive title to the property,
having claimed total performance under the contract; they then claimed that Appellant's
failure to transfer title is wrongful. In short, Appellees' claims in this action do not make
out a cause of action under the quiet title statute. The relief afforded by the trial court
thereunder was therefore improvident, and should be reversed.
POINT II

GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDED THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULING THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
APPELLEES WERE ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC
ENFORCEMENT OF THE 1987 REAL ESTATE CONTRACT

There is no more fundamental rule of law than the proposition that summary
judgment should never be entered in the presence of genuine issues of triable fact.
Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 Utah 130, 63 P.3d 705; Jackson v. Mateus,
2003 Utah 18, 70 P.3d 78; Couris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 2003 Utah 19, 70 P.3d 72. A
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motion for summary judgment must assume facts as asserted by the opposing party, and
granted only where, given that assumption, there is still no way that the opposing party
could prevail. Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984). Even a single sworn
statement is sufficient to preclude summary judgment- Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170
(Utah 1983).
The record before the trial court clearly establishes the presence of a pivotal issue
of fact, which should have precluded the entry of summary judgment on Appellees' quiet
title/specific performance claim. As such, the ruling of the lower court should be
reversed.
A.

Appellees Failed to Perform in Full the Requirements of the 1987 Real
Estate Contract, and Were Thus Precluded From Seeking Specific
Enforcement Thereof.
The first claim for relief in Appellees' complaint sought an order of this court

declaring that Appellant, although not a party to the 1987 real estate contract (see below)
was in breach thereof, and entering "an order of specific performance requiring
Defendant to properly execute a warranty deed to Plaintiffs giving them an unencumbered
title to the property in question" (Complaint, R.0015, <| 28). In response to Appellees'
motion for summary judgment, the lower court initially recognized the impropriety of
finding in their favor as a matter of law:
The court believes there are genuine issues of material fact in this
case, such as whether Plaintiffs successfully completed the escrow
conditions.
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(Court's ruling of September 6, 2000, R.0237, p. 1). On motion for reconsideration,
however, the trial court entered its October 2, 2000 Memorandum Decision (R.0247),
reversing its prior holding and finding that, as a matter of law, Appellees were not in
breach of the 1987 agreement (or that any such breach had been waived by Georgia
Lamar West prior to her death-see (B), below), and entered an order of specific
performance of the contract.
Specific performance is an equitable remedy (Romrell v. Zions First National
Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980)). As such, a party seeking specific performance is
seeking equity, and must "do equity" by performing his/her obligation under the
agreement, in order to merit the requested relief. LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorian, 753 P.2d 961
(Utah 1988).
Appellees' 1987 bargain with Georgia Lamar West was clear and specific in its
terms: upon full payment of the entire purchase price-including all assessed
taxes-Appellees were entitled to conveyance of Georgia Lamar West's right, title and
interest in and to the subject property:
The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and
nature which are or which may be assessed and which may become due on
these premises during the life of this Agreement.
By Appellees' own admission, they paid no taxes whatever on the subject property
at any time during the contract period, their own express covenant to do so
notwithstanding. Their own sworn testimony establishes this fact-supplemental affidavit
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of Mary Helen West (R.0210) at ^ 4 and 5; supplemental affidavit of Arnold Kay West
(R.0213) at Tj 4 and 5; the Court's ruling granting summary judgment (R. 0247)
acknowledged as much.
Having failed to perform according to the contract (unless such performance is
excused-see below), Appellees came before the trial court with unclean hands, and were
not entitled to the remedy of specific performance.
B.

Reallocation of Appellees' Tax Payment Obligation to Lamar West
Would Constitute a Material Modification of the 1987 Agreement, and
Is Therefore Barred by Operation of the Statute of Frauds.
The trial court's dismissal of Appellees' admitted failure to pay property taxes on

the Subject Property during the contract period was based on the doctrine of "waiver."
Setting aside, for the moment, that a significant fact question existed concerning the
applicability of the waiver doctrine in this case (see Subpoint C, below), it is submitted
that the trial court disregarded the express terms of the contract, and Appellees' aversion
of the facts concerning the "waiver" claim.
In their supplemental affidavits before the court (R. 0210 and 0213), Appellees'
both testify as follows:
On several occasions over the course of several years, Lamar West stated to
me and my husband [/wife] that we did not have to worry about paying the
property taxes on the property and that she would pay the property taxes for
the time period that the warranty deed was held in escrow.
(Supplemental Affidavit of Mary Helen West, R. 0210 at ^f 4; Supplemental Affidavit of
Arnold K. West, R. 0213 at ^ 4; emphasis added.) In other words, even accepting
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Appellees' controverted testimony, Lamar West not only waived Appellees' performance
under the 1987 agreement concerning tax payment, but affirmatively offered to assume
their obligation in this regard.
The urged testimony, in short, constitutes a material modification of the terms of
the contract, transferring a significant obligation away from the purchasers and onto the
vendor. It is well established that, where a contract falls within the operation of Utah's
Statute of Frauds, any material modification of its terms, like the contract itself, must be
in writing. This was established in the case of Zion 's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d
1319 (Utah 1975), in which the Supreme Court stated the following:
It is elementary that when a contract is required to be in writing, the same
requirement applies with equal force to any alteration or modification
thereof [citing Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1].
538P.2datl322.
It is beyond dispute that the 1987 agreement was a contract for conveyance of an
interest in land, and fell squarely within Utah's Statute of Frauds. Appellees' reliance
upon a verbal modification of the terms of that agreement, and a transfer of responsibility
thereunder from purchaser to vendor, or, in this case, to Appellant (see below) clearly
falls afoul of the Statute of Frauds. For this reason, it should have been disregarded by
the lower court, and summary judgment denied.
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C.

Appellees' Performance Under the Real Estate Contract Was Not
Excused as a Matter of Law Under the Doctrine of Waiver.
In reversing its own prior order recognizing the existence of genuine issues of

material fact precluding summary judgment herein, the lower court determined that, as a
matter of law, Appellees' contractual obligation to pay taxes on the property during the
contract period had been waived. Observing that "Plaintiffs concede that they did not
pay taxes on the property while the warranty deed was in escrow" (court's memorandum
decision of October 2, 2000, R.0247, at p. 2), the court concluded that, by her conduct,
Georgia Lamar West had waived the tax obligation under the contract; the court further
concluded that such waiver had been established as a matter of law, and that no genuine
issue of material fact existed thereon which would justify trial (or even oral argument see Point III, below). R.0245
The court's ruling, however, flatly overlooked the following:
i.

As noted above, while Appellees filed affidavits declaring that

Georgia Lamar West had stated that they "did not have to worry about paying the
property taxes on the property and that she would pay the property taxes for the
time period that the warranty was held in escrow" (R.0210 and 0213), the record is
devoid of any evidence that the 1987 real estate contract was ever modified in
writing to reflect such waiver.
ii.

Appellees' suggestion that Georgia Lamar West blithely volunteered

to pay real estate taxes on their behalf (in the place of having required Appellees to
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do so by contract) is flatly contradicted by Lamar West's declarations to Appellant,
the designated trustee of both the 1993 and 1999 trusts, expressing concern that the
taxes were not being paid - Defendants Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of
Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents (R.0666) at p. 6.
iii.

Lamar West's declarations to Appellant, moreover, were consistent

with her other expressions of concern regarding Appellees' treatment of her,
including reports that Appellees were forging checks on her account, and were
threatening to place her in a nursing home - Id.
iv.

Most important, Lamar West's clear lack of intent to waive the

property tax requirement is most clearly emphasized by the fact that, in 1993, she
conveyed her right in and to the subject property to the 1993 trust; further, that
upon Appellees' demand for issuance of a corrective deed, Georgia Lamar West by Appellees own admission - flatly refused the requested conveyance (Complaint,
R.0015, atT[ 13).
Waiver of a contracted-for right may only be found from words or conduct
evincing the deliberate relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, one's
actions or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in some unequivocal manner an
intent to waive, and must be inconsistent with any other intent - Hunter v. Hunter, 669
P.2d 430 (Utah 1983). Georgia Lamar West's words are in dispute between the parties;
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her conduct most definitely is not. Had she intended to waive the tax requirement when
asked for a corrective deed in 1998, why would she refuse? Why would she thereafter
direct conveyance of the property from the 1993 trust to the 1999 trust? The trial court's
finding of waiver, in light of the foregoing uncertainties, was clearly error, and should be
reversed.
POINT III APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FOUND IN
BREACH OF THE 1987 REAL ESTATE AGREEMENT
It is undisputed that Appellant, Claudia N. Case, was not a party to the 1987 real
estate agreement, either individually or in her capacity as trustee of either the 1993 or the
1999 trust. Nevertheless, the lower court found that, as a matter of law, Appellant was in
breach of that agreement for failure to disregard her mother's clear intent and convey the
Subject Property to Appellants without their having fulfilled the terms of the agreement.
Given the undisputed (much less the Appellant's version of disputed) facts in this matter,
the finding was clearly in error.
The October 2, 2000 memorandum decision (R.0247) concluded, without much
explanation, that the 1987 contract was binding on the "heirs, executors, administrators,
successors and assigns" of Lamar West - and leapt therefrom with the conclusion that
Appellant was in breach of the agreement, notwithstanding the fact that her mother, not
herself, had been responsible for conveyance of the property into the first trust, and from
the first trust to the second trust, in defiance of any obligation under the 1987 agreement.
Even assuming that the withholding of title to the Subject Property from Appellants was
700216v l
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wrongful, the act is ascribable to Georgia Lamar West (and thereafter to her estate), and
not to the trusts or to Appellant as trustee thereof.
At Appellees' urging, the lower court disregarded this distinction, citing the case
of Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Company, 888 P.2d 659 (Court of
Appeals, Utah 1994). The court's reliance in this regard, however, was misplaced.
It is important to remember that the Lamar West Trust obtained its interest in the
subject property by quit-claim deed, not by inheritance. In Oquirrh, addressing
contractual language very similar to that in the instant case, the court held that such a
conveyance does not impose liability upon the successor under the contract:
Oquirrh argues that by accepting the quitclaim deed, Forthcoming became a
direct "successor" of the Loiselles in accordance with the terms of the
Oquirrh-Loiselle contract and thus, became contractually bound to the terms
of that agreement.
However, Oquirrh's claim fails for several reasons. First, the language in
the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract referring to "heirs, executors, administrators,
successors and assigns" of the parties can only refer to those who succeed
to one party's interest in the contract through inheritance, assignment, or
the like. A quitclaim deed is generally defined as "[a] deed of conveyance
operating by way of release; that is, intended to pass any title, interest, or
claim which the grantor may have in the premises" Black's Law Dictionary
1251 (6th ed.1990) (emphasis added). Furthermore, such a deed "purports
to transfer nothing more than [an] interest which [the] grantor may have.
Id. (emphasis added).
888 P.2d at 663. Thus, the Oquirrh decision holds that an entity which receives title by
quit claim deed is not a successor to the contract.
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Numerous other decisions confirm that the grantee of a buyer's interest under a
contract does not become bound to perform any of the obligations of the contract. In
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Hansens sold a
motel to Synvest Corporation. Synvest immediately conveyed its interest to a partnership
known as Green River Group, which included some of the same principals as Synvest.
The contract signed by Green River Group included the following clause: "Buyer agrees
to abide and be bound by the conditions that appear in all underlying contract [sic]." 748
P.2d at 1104. Hansens attempted to hold Green River Group liable for breaches of
contract by Synvest. The claim was stronger than that in the instant case because Green
River Group had arguably agreed to be bound by the terms of the underlying contract.
The court nonetheless held that Hansens had only privity of estate and not privity of
contract with Green River Group and could not be held liable for any breach of contract
to Hansens.
Similarly, in Andrus v. Bagley, 775 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989), Dolans conveyed
property to Bagleys, who conveyed it to Hayeses, who conveyed it to Andrus. After
Andrus paid off the contract, he sought to obtain a warranty deed fro his predecessors in
title. Dolans were nowhere to be found, so he sought a judgment against Bagleys for
failing to deliver the deed. Andrus sought, and the trial court awarded, attorney fees
against Bagleys. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Bagley-Hayes
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contract was not assigned to Andrus and he was not a third-party beneficiary under that
contract.
In Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940), Latses purchased
property in which Nick Floor was an existing tenant and attempted to evict Nick Floor.
The trial court held Nick Floor had a valid long-term lease and denied the eviction, but
also awarded Nick Floor $500.00 as attorney fees against Latses. The award of attorney
fees was based on the lease between Nick Floor and Latses' predecessor in title. The
Utah Supreme Court reversed the attorney fee award:
The lower court in deciding in favor of respondent awarded it $500
as attorney's fees. Appellants take exception to this allowance on the
ground that there is no privity between them and respondent, and that this
covenant is not one running with the land. We are of the opinion that
appellants are correct in their version of this part of the case. This was
purely a personal covenant as between the parties to the contract. Though
appellants purchased the property subject to the tenancy, they did not
expressly agree to abide by the terms of the lease.
104P.2d619at624.
Appellant was not joined in this action as Lamar West's heir, or as the personal
representative of her estate. She was sued as trustee of two trusts, each of which held title
to the subject property, in turn, by quit claim conveyance, not by inheritance or
assignment. As such, no remedy should have been afforded against Appellant on the
trust's behalf.
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POINT IV

APPELLEES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT AFFORDING
APPELLANT A HEARING

As demonstrated by the attached orders, the trial court entered numerous interim
decisions before finally deciding this matter (at one point completely contradicting
itself) - all without granting to Appellant her repeated request for oral argument on the
issues before the court. In the face of Appellees' motion for summary judgment,
Appellant requested oral argument (R.0190); when the court subsequently reversed itself
upon Appellees' request for clarification (again requesting oral argument-R.0241),
Appellant moved for an amendment to the order and for reconsideration, again asserting
her right to oral argument (R.0299). Upon submittal of her motion for decision,
Appellant renewed her request for oral argument (R. 0326). That the trial court entered
each of the attached orders without affording either party a hearing on their contentions.
Rule 4-501(3)(C), Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, in effect at the time of
the lower court's rulings, expressly granted to Appellant the opportunity for oral
argument before entry of an order granting a dispositive motion;
In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the
time of filing the principle memorandum in support of or in opposition to a
motion may file a written request for a hearing. .. such request shall be
granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the
motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues
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governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively
decided.8
The trial court made no finding that Appellant was frivolous in her opposition to
Appellees' motion for summary judgment, or that the issues underlying the motion had
been "authoritatively decided". Indeed, the trial court itself first found in Appellant's
favor, and reversed itself only upon subsequent motion. It is submitted that, under these
circumstances, the affording of an oral argument was incumbent on the lower court, and
its refusal constituted reversible error.
CONCLUSION
Regrettably, the pivotal fact in this case - the intentions of Georgia Lamar West
concerning the rights of one daughter over her remaining children - rest with the words
and intents of a deceased witness. The trier of fact, under such circumstances, must piece
together the decedents desires and intents from the remaining evidence: her words to
others, and her conduct.
It is respectfully submitted, however, that the lower court disregarded completely
the presence of clear issues of triable fact in concluding that Appellees were entitled, as a
matter of law, to a conveyance of title in and to the subject property, as well as an award
of costs and attorney's fees against the Appellant in her representative capacity.

8

In 2003, Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration was repealed,
and its requirements incorporated into a revision of Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; recorded requirements for oral argument on a dispositive motion are now
contained at Rule 7(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Appellees' failure to live up to the terms of the contract, supported by nothing more than
their self-serving declarations concerning verbal waiver by a deceased parent, should not
have been sufficient to withstand a challenge to the motion for summary judgment, as the
trial court itself initially found.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the entry of summary judgment by
the trial court should be reversed, and this matter remitted for trial on the merits.
DATED this 27th day of June, 2005.
JONES WALDO H O p R O O K & McDONOUGH, PC

By
'Vincent C. Rampton
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this 27th day of June, 2005:

James "Tucker" Hansen
James "Tucker" Hansen, P.C.
306 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003
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Bruce R. Murdock, Bar No. 6948
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
306 West Main Street
American Fork, Utah 84003
Telephone: (801)756-7658
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN
WEST,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually,
and as Trustee of the Lamar
West Trust dated May 6, 1993 and
as Trustee of the Georgia Lamar
West Trust dated January 21, 1999,

)
)

ORDER

]
]
) Case No. 990404457
"
) Judge Gary D. Stott

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment against Defendant Claudia N. Case, as Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated May 6,
1993 and as Trustee of the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated January 21, 1999, on Plaintiffs' first
two causes of action alleged in their Complaint, Breach of Contract and Quiet Title. Plaintiffs
were represented by Bruce R. Murdock and Defendant was represented by Don R. Peterson.
After having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties in support of and in opposition to
the motion, the accompanying affidavits and exhibits, and all other relevant documents in the file,

the Court makes the following ORDER:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Claudia N.
Case, as Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 1993 and as Trustee of the Georgia
Lamar West Trust dated January 21, 1999, is granted. Defendant is Lamar West's successor
pursuant to the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (hereafter "Contract") entered into
between Lamar West and Plaintiffs in early 1987. By failing to deliver a proper warranty deed to
Plaintiffs, as required by paragraph 19 of the Contract, Defendant is in breach of the Contract.
2. Title is quieted in Plaintiffs Arnold K. West and Mary Helen West in the
Contract property, which is properly described as follows:
Parcel 2; Beginning 378.50 feet West along the monument line and 333.45 feet
South from the American Fork City monument at the centerline intersection of 300
West street and 300 North street; thence North 84°30' West 30.00 feet; thence
South 16°59,15M West 176.14 feet to the North Right-of-Way line of Union Pacific
Railroad Co.; thence South 63°23' East 89.29 feet along said Right-of-Way line;
thence North 0°25' East 205.68 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 0.25
acres.
Parcel 3; Beginning 378.50 feet West along the monument line and South 333.45
feet from the American Fork City monument at the centerline intersection of 300
West street and 300 North street; thence South 0°25'00M West 205.58 feet to the
north Right-of-Way line of the Union Pacific Railroad Co.; thence South 63°23,00"
East 55.40 feet along said Right-of-Way line; thence North 0°25'00n East 225.61
feet along a fence line; thence North 84°30'00" West 49.91 feet to the point of
beginning. Containing .0246 acres.
3. Defendant is ordered to execute and deliver a proper Warranty Deed to
Plaintiffs for the property described in paragraph 2, which deed shall be prepared by Plaintiffs'

2

counsel. Defendant is ordered to execute and deliver this deed within ten days from the date of
this Order. If Defendant does not execute and deliver the deed to Plaintiffs within ten days from
the date of this Order, the clerk of the court is authorized to execute the deed on behalf of
Defendant.
4. Plaintiffs are awarded their reasonable attorney's fees and court costs piursuant
to paragraph 21 of the Contract in the amount of $156.00 in court costs and $6,146.50 attorney's
fees, as established by the Affidavit of Bruce R. Murdock, for a total award of $6,302.50, and
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendant in this amount.

DATED this _/_ day of /JdO^i'^S^'T,

2000.

BY THE COURT:

JL/J

/?S / / - V 7 X

<r%dt mtf-^\
GaryD. Stott
/ ' / £-:V.\
.
Fourth Judicial District Cpurt Judge
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Approved as to form:

Don R. Petersen
Attorney for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order this /3 day of October, 2000 to the following:
Don R. Petersen
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
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JAMES "TUCKER" HANSEN, Bar No 5711
BRUCE R. MURDOCK, Bar No. 6948
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
306 West Main Street
American Fork, Utah 84003
Telephone: (801) 756-7658
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN
WEST,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR AMENDMENT OF
ORDER AND FOR RECONSIDERATION AJND DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

vs.

CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, and as
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated
May 6, 1993 and as Trustee of the
Georgia Lamar West Trust dated
January 21,1999,

Case No. 990404457

DIVISION*

\

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER having come before the above-entitled court,
Defendant's Motion for Amendment of Order and for Reconsideration and Defendant's Request
for Oral Argument, and the Court having reviewed the relevant memoranda on file herein, and
the Court having taken the matter under advisement,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Defendant's
Motion for Amendment of Order and for Reconsideration, and Defendant's Request for Oral
Argument are hereby denied, and Plaintiffs are hereby granted Judgment against the Defendant

for their reasonable attorney's fees incurred in having to respond to the above Motion and as set
forth more fully in the attached Affidavit of Attorney's fees filed herewith.
DATED this

(j

day of February, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

MAILING CERTIFICATE

''<%&'^^'/0'

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AMENDMENT OF ORDER AND FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT,
postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this

l^t

day of February, 2001, to the following:

Don R. Petersen
HOWARD, LEWIS& PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
120 East 300 North
P.O.Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603

SECRETARY/

Tab 3

FILED
^ou* ,n Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

1-

DON R. PETERSEN (2576) and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 25,469

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN
WEST,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER CLARIFYING JUDGMENT
Case No. 990404457
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Division #7

CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, and as
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated
May 6, 1993 and as Trustee of the
Georgia Lamar West Trust dated January
21, 1999,
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion for Order Clarifying Judgments filed March 5, 2001, came
regularly before the Court for consideration. No party opposed the motion and the time for
response has expired. The Court therefore grants the motion.
Based on the motion of defendant and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Order entered November 1, 2000, and the

Judgment entered February 16, 2001, do not impose any monetary judgment against Claudia N.
Case individually.

/^\

DATED this

.

J P d a y of
ofJuke,
Jyte, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

&ZE2S&
STEVEI^Ll HANSEN
District Judge

MAILING CERTIHCATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this _ c _ day of June, 2001.
James "Tucker" Hansen, Esq.
Duval, Hansen, Witt & Morley
306 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003

fAJlLF:\LWS\CASE-CLA.ORD

Tab 4

Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)521-3200
Fax:(801)328-0537
Attorneys for Defendant Claudia N. Case
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN
WEST,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

vs.
CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, and as
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated May 6,
1993, and as Trustee of the Georgia Lamar
West Trust dated January 21, 1999,

Civil No. 990404457
Division 7
Judge James E. Taylor

Defendant.

Based on the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' claims for slander of title in the above entitled
action, as pled at the Third Cause of Action in Plaintiffs Complaint herein, be and hereby are
dismissed with prejudice.
This Order, coupled with (1) this Court's Order of November 1, 2000; (2) this Court's
Judgment of February 1, 2001, and (3) this Court's Order Clarifying Judgment of July 2, 2001,

dS67!iv;

all entered in this action, shall constitute final judgment on the merits of all issues in this action
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this J \

day of March, 2005.

BY THE COURT

James E. Taylor
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

James 'Tucker" H. Hansen

d*ft"iIv i
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